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RESTRUCTURING FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROPOSALS
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT*
Ten years ago this month, in the course of his annual address to
the American Law Institute, Mr. Chief Justice Warren said that it is
essential that we achieve a proper jurisdictional balance be-
tween the Federal and State court systems, assigning to each
system those cases most appropriate in the light of the basic
principles of federalism.1
He called on the Institute to undertake a study defining, in the light
of modern conditions, what the jurisdiction should be of the two
systems of courts.2 The Institute, of course, was glad to accept the
task suggested by the Chief Justice, and in the intervening years much
of the time and energy of the Institute has been devoted to this project.
At the Annual Meeting in May, 1968, the lawyers and judges and
professors who make up the Institute voted final approval of the
recommendations submitted to them. The Reporters have since done
the necessary editorial revision, and ten days from today, when Chief
Justice Warren appears for the last time to address the Institute as
Chief Justice, he will be presented with the final official draft of the
Institute's Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and
Federal Courts.3
Chief Justice Warren's proposal that a study of this kind be made
was a wise one. The United States is virtually unique in having two
independent systems of courts throughout the country, with one
deriving its authority from the national government while the other
*The John Randolph Tucker Lecture, delivered at Washington and Lee Uni-
versity on May io, 1969.
tCharles T. McCormick Professor of Law, The University of Texas. A.B. 1947,
Wesleyan University; LL.B. 1949, Yale University. Reporter, American Law Institute
Study on the Division of Jurisdiction Betveen State and Federal Courts, 1963-1969.
136 ALl PROCEEDINGS 33 (1959).
'9d. at 34.
2STUDY OF DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTs (Official
Draft 1969) (hereafter referred to as STuDY).
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is the creation of the constituent members of the federal union. At
the Constitutional Convention and in the ratification debates the
concept of lower federal courts was vigorously resisted.4 They were
created, however, by the Judiciary Act of 1789, and, though there
are occasional suggestions even today that a single unified system
of courts would be a better idea,5 it seems safe to assume that an
institution that has existed for i8o years is likely to prove permanent.
But though we have come to accept the idea of state and federal
courthouses a block from each other, and of courts with jurisdiction
that often overlaps, there had not been, until the Chief Justice made
his suggestion, any comprehensive attempt to justify the division of
functions between the two systems in terms of principles of federalism.
Indeed the jurisdiction presently vested in the federal courts is the
result of statutes enacted at various times in our history with various
specific purposes in mind. The present jurisdictional pattern was
heavily influenced by the tragic events that culminated very near to
here at Appomattox Courthouse.6 And the last major change in the
structure of the federal courts was the Judges' Bill of 1 925,
7 a statute
that is older than I am.
It is, of course, perfectly possible that, despite their age and the
episodic nature of their origins, the present statutes provide for the
wisest and best possible allocation of judicial business between state
and federal courts. But if this should be the case, it would be a
striking proof of Hamlet's assertion that "there's a divinity that shapes
our ends, rough-hew them how we will."s As we shall see, it was the
conclusion of the American Law Institute that we have not been so
fortunate, and that much improvement is possible.
CRITERIA FOR ALLOCATING JURISDICTION
What criteria are there to test the appropriateness of an alloca-
tion of jurisdiction between state and federal courts? I suggest that
there are four.
First, is the division rational? There ought to be some better basis
4C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTs 2-3 (1963).
5Anderson, The Line Between Federal and State Court Jurisdiction, 63 MICH.
L. Rav. 123o (1965); Anderson, The Problems of the Federal Courts-and How the
State Courts Might Help, 54 A.B.A.J. 352 (1968).
6Wright, The Federal Courts-a Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A.J.
742 (1966).
7Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936.
8Hamlet, act V, scene ii, line io.
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for allowing a federal court or a state court jurisdiction over a particu-
lar kind of case than that it has been done that way in the past.
Second, is the division clear? This is similar to what the late Pro-
fessor Chafee called the Bright Line Policy.9 A lawyer of reasonable
ability should be able to read the statute and tell with fair assurance
whether a particular court has jurisdiction of his case rather than
being trapped by ambiguous language into bringing his case in the
wrong court.
Third, is the division consistent with efficient judicial administra-
tion? We live in an age in which most courts, state and federal, have
congested dockets, and this situation is likely to become even more
grave. Jurisdictional allocations cannot reduce the burden of the case-
load on the entire system. The case must ultimately be heard in some
court. But the jurisdictional allocation should not aggravate these
burdens by permitting extensive preliminary litigation to decide where
the case is to be heard, or by requiring wasteful duplication of pro-
ceedings from a single controversy in both systems of courts, or by
shuttling the litigants in a particular case back and forth between
the two systems.
Fourth, is the division designed to reduce friction between the
two systems? In a federal system there will always be conflicts between
the national government and the state governments, and between
the judicial systems they have created, but the jurisdictional division
should not provide unnecessary occasions for conflict.
The four matters to which I have referred are criteria for evalua-
tion. They are not categorical imperatives. So long as we have two
systems of courts, we are going to have some measure of irrationality,
unclarity, inefficiency, and friction. Indeed these criteria at times point
in different directions. If, for example, the jurisdictional line is painted
in bold, clear strokes, it is likely to leave on one side of the line
particular cases that more rationally should be placed on the other,
yet the nicer distinctions a truly rational allocation would suggest
can only be made by a statute that is less clear, either because of the
complexity of its provisions or because it states matters very generally
and leaves much to particularized determinations in individual cases.
Indeed my four suggested criteria remind me somewhat of the test
recently announced for determining the validity of a congressional
apportionment. We can never fully satisfy these criteria, just as we
can never have absolute mathematical equality in an apportionment,
OZ, CUAFEE, SOMfE PROBLEMS OF EquiTY 1i-i6 (1950).
188 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
but we are entitled to demand that some justification be shown for any
deviation from these.
10
Anyone who is familiar with the present jurisdictional pattern
must surely recognize that there are many respects in which it is
seriously defective when measured by these proposed tests. Only a
few examples need be given for each of the four tests to illustrate the
point.
Take first the test of rationality. Suppose that while I am in
Lexington this weekend the car I am driving collides with Dean Stein-
heimer's car, and each of us is seriously injured. He is a citizen of
Virginia and I am a citizen of Texas, so that there exists between
us that ancient ground for federal jurisdiction, "diversity of citizen-
ship." I can sue Dean Steinheimer in the federal court for the Western
District of Virginia, on the theory, accepted since 1789 but in recent
years heavily challenged, that a Virginia state court might be preju-
diced against me because I am from far away while the dean lives
here. So far so good-at least for those who accept the theory that
a Virginia state court might be prejudiced against a Texan while a
federal court in Virginia will be free from such prejudice. Suppose
however that I am not worried about prejudice and I choose to sue
in state court. Even though there is still diversity between us, Dean
Steinheimer cannot remove the case from state to federal court. If I
am willing to take my chances with the state court, the dean, as "a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought,"" is not given
any choice in the matter. This still fits with the theory and is a rational
pattern. But now suppose that the dean wins the race to the court-
house, and he brings suit against me before I can sue him. He may
sue in the state court if he wants to-but he is also free to commence
his action in federal court if he prefers. Perhaps there is some reason
why a local citizen should be allowed to invoke federal jurisdiction
in a suit against someone from out of state, but I have yet to under-
stand what that reason is.
Let me give one other example of the irrationality of the present
pattern. Suppose that I think that state officials are denying me the
right to vote, or the right of freedom of speech, or one of the other
great rights secured by the Constitution of the United States. I can
sue those state officers in federal court. It does not matter how small
my claim may be, or that it cannot even be valued in money.12 But
20Cf. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
n28 U.S.C. § i44i(b) (1964).
228 U.S.C. 1343 (1964); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 518-532 (1939) (Stone, J.,
concurring).
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imagine that my claim is against federal officers rather than state
officers. In that case the door of federal court will be open to me
only if my claim is for more than $ao,ooo.13 Judge Medina has re-
cently referred to this as "an unfortunate gap in the statutory jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts .... ,"-4 It is indeed unfortunate, and it is
almost certainly a mere happenstance of history rather than the result
of a conscious choice. But a rational pattern of federal-state jurisdiction
should be based on conscious choices rather than happenstances.
Many more examples could be put, but those are enough to suggest
the lack of rationality of the present allocation. I turn now to clarity
and Professor Chafee's Bright Line Policy. A labor union brings pres-
sure to bear on an employer to have it fire its mine superintendent.
The superintendent wants to collect damages from the union. He has
two grounds on which to bring such a suit. He claims that the union
is guilty of a secondary boycott, in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act,
and also that the union has been guilty of a conspiracy in violation
of state law. Clearly the Taft-Hartley Act claim "arises under the ...
laws .... of the United States" and can be heard in federal court.15
Can the state law claim be joined with it-assuming there is no di-
versity-or must it be the subject of a separate suit in state court?
The statutes are silent. There is a statute saying that a person who
has a claim under the copyright, patent, or trademark laws may join
with it "a substantial and related claim"' 6 of unfair competition but
this, of course, has no application on the facts I have given you. The
Supreme Court, however, has held that the statute about copyrights
and patents is merely a particular application of something called
"pendent jurisdiction." Whenever there is a state claim joined with
a federal claim, the federal court has power to decide the whole
case provided the two claims "derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact" and are such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.' 7 I think this is
a good rule, but one should not have to search the United States
Reports in order to find it, and it is especially unfortunate that the
statutes are affirmatively misleading by seeming to confine the prin-
ciple much more narrowly.
Let me give one other example of lack of clarity. Suppose that
a railroad has settled a claim against it some years back by agreeing
1228 US.C. § x331(a); Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. ii,
393 U.S. 233 (1968).
"Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1967).
'2a8 US.C. § 1331(a) (1964).
2028 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964).
27United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 US. 715, 725 (1966).
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to give the claimant an annual pass for the rest of his life. Then
Congress passes a statute barring railroads from giving free passes.
The railroad is in a quandary. It wants to honor its contract but it
also wants to obey the law. Does the statute about free passes apply
where there is an existing contractual obligation to give the passes?
If it does apply, is it unconstitutional since it takes away a property
right of the person who would otherwise be entitled to a pass? The
railroad's lawyers come up with a solution. They will bring an action
for a declaratory judgment and find out from the courts what they
should do in these circumstances. Can they bring this action in federal
court, assuming that there is no diversity? It would seem that they
should be able to do so, since the only issues in the case are issues of
the meaning and constitutionality of an Act of Congress, just the
kind of issues that a federal court is best qualified to hear. The aver-
age intelligent lawyer is likely to believe not only that the railroad
should be able to sue in federal court but that it can do so. The suit
looks like a case "arising under" the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and thus to be within "federal question" jurisdiction.
And the lawyer who knows that the courts have put a gloss on that
statute, and have held that the federal question must appear on the
face of the well-pleaded complaint, is still not likely to perceive any
obstacle. The complaint in the declaratory judgment action states,
as it must, a claim based directly on federal law. Despite all of this,
the answer probably is that the case must be brought in state court.
I say "probably" because no one can be absolutely sure of the answer
until the case is actually decided. But there is strong language from
the Supreme Court warning against using "artful pleading" to permit
a suit that could not otherwise be heard in federal court to be brought
there under the guise of an action for a declaratory judgment.'s
What this appears to mean in my hypothetical case is that it is
not enough for federal jurisdiction that the well-pleaded complaint
presents a federal question. Instead we must turn the clock back
to the days before 1934, when there was no such thing as a suit for
a declaratory judgment in federal court. In those days the controversy
between the railroad and the man who wanted a pass would not have
been heard in federal court. The only way the case could get to
court at all would be for the man to bring a suit against the railroad
to require it to give him his pass. That suit, the Court held years
ago, was not properly brought in federal court, since a claim for
1Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673-674 (1950). See C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 18 (1963).
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breach of contract is a state law claim, and the federal question
entered only through the defense of the railroad that the new statute
makes it unlawful for it to perform its contract.1 9 Since the case
could not have come to federal court prior to 1934, we must resort
to this ancient history to bar it from federal court today, even though
we now have available an action for a declaratory judgment, some-
thing we did not have in the old days.
My third test is efficiency of judicial administration. Here the
present allocation gets very bad marks. Cases do shuttle back and
forth from one system to the other, often for as many as io or 12
years. There is extensive preliminary litigation to decide in which
court a case will be heard. And there is a significant amount of duplica-
tion of litigation arising out of a single controversy in the two systems.
I will cite two particularly egregious examples. Suppose an action
is brought in federal court in which plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen
of Florida and the defendant is a citizen of Kentucky. Defendant
files an answer admitting the allegation of the citizenship of the
parties and expressly agreeing that the federal court has jurisdiction.
Defendant then takes depositions and occupies the time of the court
with various pre-trial motions. At a point when the court has indicated
it is going to decide the case for the plaintiff, and perhaps even when
the statute of limitations would bar a new suit in state court, defendant
files an amended answer. In the new answer he denies that he is a
citizen of Kentucky, and alleges instead that he is, and at all times
has been, a citizen of Florida, so that the federal court lacks jurisdic-
tion. The court agrees, and orders the federal action dismissed.20 This
hardly seems to meet the test of common fairness, to say nothing of
the test of efficient judicial administration, and yet the rule in federal
court has long been that if at any stage of a case it appears that there
is no federal jurisdiction, the action must be dismissed.
Ordinarily one or both of the parties have a choice about whether
a case that could be heard in federal court shall be heard there, and,
as in my suit against Dean Steinheimer, may opt for a state forum if
they prefer. This is not always true, since there are some kinds of
cases that Congress has said may only be heard in a federal court,
that are, in the customary phrase, within "exclusive federal jurisdic-
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
20Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940); Knee v. Chemical Leaman Tank
Lines, Inc., 293 F. Supp. io94 (E.D. Pa. iq68); cf. Ramsey v. Mellon Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 35o F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1965). But cf. Di Frischia v. New York Cent.
R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3 d Cir. 196o).
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tion." Imagine that we have one of these cases, but that plaintiff does
not realize that there is no choice about it, and he sues in state court.
At some later point one or both of the parties realizes the mistake, and
undertakes to remove the case to the federal court where it should
have been all along. Strangely-indeed incredibly-the federal court
cannot hear the case. Even though the case has now been brought to
the only court with jurisdiction to hear it, it is required to dismiss
the case, since the state court from which the case was removed had
no jurisdiction and therefore, so it is said, there was no pending case
that could be removed.21 If someone were deliberately undertaking to
devise the least efficient possible court system, this would be a pretty
good rule to adopt. To the rest of us it must smack of Alice in Wonder-
land.
On the fourth of the proposed tests, avoiding unnecessary friction
between the two court systems, the present rules come off better than
they do on the first three tests, but they still could be better than they
are. Why should federal courts be allowed to enjoin proceedings in
a state court under a statute so general and open-ended that it is
insignificant as a limitation on federal court power 22 while a state
court cannot enjoin federal court proceedings even to protect against
vexatious and harassing relitigation of matters previously determined
by the state court?23 Why should it be possible for a litigant to bring
a state court action to naught by filing a frivolous petition for re-
moval just before the case is submitted to the jury in the state court?24
Why should a state court be asked to decide questions of state law
in a case while being told that it is not to pass on the federal issues,
and that the parties plan to return to federal court for the ultimate
decision of the case?25
THE LAW INSTITUTE PROPOSALS
For the last decade the American Law Institute, in response to the
request of the Chief Justice, has been examining the present juris-
dictional statutes from the point of view of the four tests I have sug-
gested, and has been attempting to devise statutory solutions that will
cure the specific anomalies and deficiencies I have mentioned, as
well as many more. The end result, the volume that will be presented
=E.g., General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261 (1922).
"28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
"Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
"See STUDY 357-360.
-England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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to the Chief Justice in a few days, is 587 pages long. It includes drafts
of statutes that would, if enacted, replace the present chapters of the
Judicial Code dealing with jurisdiction, venue, and removal in the
federal district courts, and it proposes a great many related changes
to other sections of the Judicial Code and of the United States Code
generally.
The work has been under the direction of Professor Richard H.
Field, of the Harvard Law School, who has been Chief Reporter for
the Study since its beginning. Professor Paul J. Mishkin, of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law School, was Reporter for the portion of the
Study dealing with General Diversity Jurisdiction and Multi-Party
Multi-State Jurisdiction and, since 1963, I have had the privilege of
serving as Reporter for the portions of the Study other than those on
which Professor Mishkin worked. We have been greatly aided in
the project by a distinguished group of Advisors, including seven
federal judges, five practitioners, two state judges, and two law
professors. All of our work has had to run the gamut of close
scrutiny by the Council of the Institute and again by the members
of the Institute at the Annual Meeting. Almost all of the proposals
have been before the Council and the Institute in two or more dif-
ferent years, as we have revised our proposals in the light of pro-
fessional reaction to them. Indeed one particularly difficult section
went through eight different drafts, as we struggled to reach a proper
formulation. Ten years seems like an inordinate length of time to take
for such a Study. In less time than that America has achieved the
capability to go to the moon. But the processes of the American Law
Institute are deliberate and slow-paced, in the belief that the end
product acquires additional strength from the time and care that
go into its preparation.
Professor Field has prepared a summary of the Institute's pro-
posals.26 The proposals now go to a committee of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States for study and possible submission to
Congress. The summary, it is hoped, will arouse the interest of the
profession and lead lawyers and judges to examine the complete text
of the Study so that they may express informed comments on the
subject first to the Judicial Conference and then perhaps to the
Congress. I do not want to repeat here what Professor Field has done,
but I do want to describe what seem to me the more important of
2'Field, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts-A Summary of American Law Insti-
tute Proposals, 46 F.R.D. 141 (1969).
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the proposals, and the reasons that underlie them, before speaking
briefly of the controversy they have already aroused.
Diversity Jurisdiction
Undoubtedly the proposals of the Institute with regard to diversity
jurisdiction have attracted the greatest public attention. It has been
said that this portion of the Study would "emasculate" diversity juris-
diction.27 I put to one side that the dictionary definition of "emascu-
late" 28 seems singularly difficult to apply in this context. Critics can be
excused excursions into rhetoric. In truth no one knows what the
exact effect will be. Professors Field and Mishkin, who had the re-
sponsibility for that portion of the Study, have made a conscientious
attempt to analyze the statistical effect of the diversity proposals 20
but the imperfect nature of the existing statistics and the assumptions
that must be made about how litigants will react under a very different
jurisdictional scheme make an extremely rough estimate the best
that can be offered. Probably 50% is as valid a figure as any. There
were 21,oo9 diversity cases commenced in or removed to federal
court in the fiscal year 196830 so that there would still be more than
io,ooo diversity cases a year even in the "emasculated" jurisdiction.
Fears that cutting diversity jurisdiction in half "would seriously
increase the backlog of cases in state courts, with resulting hardship
and injustice to litigants" or that they will make "what might be a
typical two-year wait in federal court into a three-year wait in state
courts" 3 1 seem plainly illusory. Ten thousand cases is a drop in the
bucket of the litigation now being heard in state courts of general
jurisdiction. To reduce diversity in half might increase by l% the
number of cases or of trials in the courts of a typical state32 and even
this modest estimate ignores the fact that, as we shall see, the Institute's
proposals for federal question jurisdiction look in the direction of
allowing access to federal court in many cases that can now only be
heard in a state court.
What justification is there for this major reduction in diversity
jurisdiction? The answer offered is that it would rationalize the
'Farage, Proposed Code Will Emasculate Diversity Jurisdiction, TIAL, April/
May 1966, at 80.
2'1. To castrate; geld. 2. To deprive of masculine vigor of spirit; to weaken."
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 324 (5 th ed. 1946).
"STUDY 465-476.
nId. at 468.
"Conflict over Cut in Federal Civil Cases, TIAL, Oct./Nov. 1968, at 3.
=STUDY 473-474-
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jurisdictional lines and permit a federal action based on diversity
only in those classes of cases with some valid justification for being in
the national courts. When I discussed earlier my litigation with Dean
Steinheimer-happily entirely hypothetical-I said that the theory of
diversity is that a state court may be prejudiced against someone from
out of state. Professors Field and Mishkin accept that theory, though
they state it rather more elegantly than I did.
The function of the jurisdiction is to assure a high level of
justice to the traveler or visitor from another state; when a
person's involvement with a state is such as to eliminate any
real risk of prejudice against him as a stranger and to make
it unreasonable to heed any objection he might make to the
quality of its judicial system, he should not be permitted to
choose a federal forum, but should be required to litigate in the
courts of the state. 33
Thus under the Institute's proposals, I could still sue the dean
in the federal court here, since I am a visitor from another state.
But if Dean Steinheimer were the one to bring suit, he could not
sue me in federal court in Virginia since there is no real risk of
prejudice against him as a stranger. Section 1302(a) of the proposals
would not permit any person to invoke diversity jurisdiction in a
state of which he is a citizen. I confessed to you earlier that I have
never understood why the local citizen is allowed to bring suit in
federal court, and it seems to me that this limitation is clearly needed.
The same logic suggested to the Reporters for the diversity por-
tions of the Study that businesses that are well established in the
state have nothing to fear from the judicial system of the state, and
that these too should be barred from invoking the jurisdiction. It is
difficult to distinguish this case in principle from that of the local
citizen, though the problems of draftsmanship become considerably
more complex in dealing with the business. In § 1302(b), the Reporters
have attempted an elaborate definition of what they call a "local
establishment" and have said that a business may not invoke diversity
jurisdiction in a state in which it has maintained a local establishment
for more than two years if the suit arises out of the activities of that
establishment. The General Motors Corporation, I would suppose,
has for many years maintained "local establishments" in many
parts of Virginia. It is a major taxpayer and employer here. The
proposal of the Institute is that if General Motors is involved in
litigation with a Virginia citizen arising out of its Virginia activi-
1Id. at 2.
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ties, it should have to do so in the Virginia courts. If, however, the suit
arises out of a transaction that took place in some other state, and
suit is brought here, the company would remain free to take the
case to federal court.
Finally the Reporters carry the principle to its ultimate, if not
beyond, in what is known as the "commuter" provision.3 4 The effect of
this, which will be more significant in such metropolitan areas as
New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago than it is in Virginia, is that
a person who lives, for example, in Newark, New Jersey, and crosses
the river each day to work in New York, could not invoke diversity
either in New Jersey or in New York.
These are the principal limitations the Institute proposes for
diversity, about which, as we shall see, strong controversy has already
arisen. There are one or two other limitations, but it is hard to see
how there can be opposition to them from anyone except those whose
rationalizing principle is that a choice of forum, for whatever reason,
is a good thing. Thus the Institute proposes to prevent people from
playing games with jurisdiction by using artificial devices either to
create or defeat diversity in particular cases. 35 The most popular,
and least defensible, of those devices has been to have a person-
frequently a secretary in the office of plaintiff's lawyer-chosen to act
as executor or administrator or guardian in order either to get into
or stay out of federal court, as may seem tactically most desirable in
a particular case. The Institute proposes that tricks of this kind be
barred by a provision that, for purposes of diversity, the citizenship
of a representative be deemed to be that of the person he represents.
The courts are already edging in this direction,3 6 but this clear abuse
of jurisdiction is better resolved by legislation than by litigation.
Though it has not been much noticed, there are several respects
in which the Institute proposes to expand the scope of diversity
jurisdiction. The law presently is that a corporation is regarded as
a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated and of the state in
which it has its principal place of business.37 If it is involved in a
lawsuit with a citizen of any state other than these two states, diversity
jurisdiction exists. But the rule is very different with a partnership, a
labor union, or some other form of unincorporated association. Here
41d., § 1302(C).
3Id., § i3oi(b)(4).
35McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968); cf. Kramer v. Caribbean
Mills, Inc., 89 S. Ct. 1487 (1969).
"28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
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it is held necessary to look at the citizenship of each of the members of
the association, and if any member is a citizen of the same state
as the other party to the lawsuit, there is no diversity. Judge
Craven, then on the district court bench, thought that such an
odd distinction-by which United States Steel can take advantage of
diversity jurisdiction but the United Steelworkers cannot-should no
longer be applied, but the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court,
while recognizing the desirability of changing the rule, held that
change should come from Congress rather than the courts. 38 The
Institute's proposal is that an unincorporated association capable of
being sued as an entity should be regarded as a citizen of the state
in which it has its principal place of business.3 9 In addition the pro-
vision barring a corporation from invoking diversity jurisdiction in
a state in which it has a local establishment would apply also to
unincorporated associations. 40 The result is that these two forms
of business enterprise would be treated substantially alike.
Another proposed expansion of diversity can be illustrated by
my putative suit against Dean Steinheimer. Suppose that my wife is
with me in the car, and she is also injured, but that her injuries are
comparatively minor, and her claim is only for $5000. Until very
recently it had been thought to be the law that her claim could not
be heard in federal court, since less than the $lo,ooo required for
diversity jurisdiction is in controversy. 41 This means that either we
must have two law suits arising from this single accident, with my
claim heard in federal court while my wife is compelled to sue in
state court, or I must forego my statutory right to bring my claim in
federal court. Neither result is appealing. There were notable opinions
from the Third and Fourth Circuits in 1968, rejecting the old
orthodoxy, and holding that if one plaintiff has a claim for more
than $io,ooo others with closely related claims for less than $io,ooo
may join in the suit.42 Unfortunately in March of this year the
Supreme Court handed down a decision that, while not directly in
point, casts doubt on whether these sensible decisions can stand.43
The Institute proposals include a provision that, though more limited
'8United Steelworkers of America v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 245 (1965),




1C. WRIG-rr, FEDERAL COURTS 103-104 (1963).
'2Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968); Stone v. Stone,
405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968).
'"Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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than I would have preferred, would allow my wife's claim to be
joined with mine in the federal action.
44
Quite commonly it happens that a potential plaintiff will, for
tactical reasons, prefer to sue in his own state court and will be
apprehensive that the defendant, from out of state, will remove the
case to federal court. One way to prevent this is to join a local citizen
as a codefendant. Under present law all defendants must be non-
residents if there is to be removal.45 If there is a good-faith claim
against the local citizen the case must be kept in state court, and
claims that the joinder of the local man is fraudulent, and was done
solely to defeat removal,46 are rarely successful and never edifying. The
Institute would change this rule and allow any defendant who could
have removed if he had been sued alone to do so regardless of what
other defendants are joined with him.
47
One final provision of the diversity sections is worth noting. There
was an interesting case a few years ago in which a North Carolina
corporation sued for $1,4o8.72 in the North Carolina state court.
Defendant, a citizen of Virginia, who had suffered substantial injuries
from the same transaction, had a claim for $78,650.00'. Under North
Carolina law he was required to plead his claim as a compulsory
counter-claim in the state court action. He then removed the case to
federal court, and it was held that he was allowed to do so.48 Surely this
result is desirable. Otherwise a plaintiff with a small claim could force
a defendant with a large claim to litigate in state court if plaintiff were
first to the courthouse. Unfortunately the weight of authority is con-
trary to the result I have just described, and would not allow removal
in these circumstances.49 The Institute would allow removal on these
facts;5 0 its provision to this effect would not only contribute clarity
on a point about which the law is unclear but would also lead to a
more rational allocation of cases between state and federal courts.
Federal Question Jurisdiction
We can now turn away from diversity for the time being and look
at what the Institute has recommended in the important area of fed-
"4STUDY § 13o1(e).
4528 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).4
6C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 88 (1968).
47STUDY § 1304(b).
43National Upholstery Co. v. Corley, 144 F. Supp. 658 (M.D.N.C. 1956).
11C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS io6 (1963).
'OSTUDY § 1304(d).
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eral question jurisdiction. Here the basic rationale is that
... federal question jurisdiction is necessary to preserve uni-
formity in federal law and to protect litigants relying on federal
law from the danger that state courts will not properly apply
that law, either through misunderstanding or lack of sym-
pathy.51
Diversity jurisdiction has always been a source of much controversy
but, in recent years at least, no one has doubted that questions of
federal law are appropriate business for federal courts. Presently there
are many cases involving important issues of federal law that cannot
be brought in a federal court. This will remain true in a few instances
if the Institute's proposals should be adopted, but for the most part
the proposals would make a federal forum open to the parties, if either
of them should prefer to litigate there, whenever there is a significant
issue of federal law in the case.
The appropriateness of a federal forum for federal issues should
not depend on the amount in controversy. The present stated require-
ment that more than 5io,ooo be in controversy for federal question
cases is largely illusory, and, to the extent that it is an actual limita-
tion, as in a suit against a federal officer, it is wholly anomalous. Thus,
with one limited exception, 52 we have proposed that federal jurisdic-
tion exist without regard to amount in controversy.53
Earlier I discussed the case of the railroad that seeks a declaratory
judgment to find out whether it may honor its contract to issue a
free pass each year despite an Act of Congress limiting the issuance
of passes. The general statute on federal question jurisdiction, §
1311(a), as we have proposed it would provide for jurisdiction in such
a case in so many words, and thus eliminate the tortuous consideration
of ancient analogies that is now needed to determine whether jurisdic-
tion exists.
Access to a federal court for the determination of federal ques-
tions should not depend on where in the country the parties live or
can be served with process. Accordingly we propose to allow nation-
wide service of process and to provide a broad choice of venue, so
that suit may be brought in a convenient court.54
The most important change required, however, by this general
rationale of the appropriate scope of federal question jurisdiction is
51d. at 4.
ld., § 1312(a)(2).
OMId., §§ 13i(a), 1312(a)(4. ip2(a)(3).
"id., § 1314.
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that the Institute has accepted the view of the Reporters that the door
of the federal court should be open where federal law is relied on as
a defense in a case. It should not be limited, as it has been since 1894,
to those cases in which federal law is the basis of the plaintiff's claim.5
The importance of uniformity in federal law, and the special compet-
ence of federal judges to interpret federal law, does not depend on
whether that law is relied on in the complaint or in the answer.
Thus we propose, in § 1312(a)(2), to allow either side to remove if
there is a substantial defense asserted arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States. This is the one place in the fed-
eral question section in which we have preserved the requirement that
more than 1owooo be in controversy. Removal on the basis of a fed-
eral defense is a device with which we have had no modern experi-
ence, and there are fears that it might be used as a tactic for harassing
plaintiffs with small claims. Accordingly it was thought best to limit
the device, initially at least, to those cases in which a significant sum
is at stake. We have also specifically excluded from removal, by §
i31i2(b), nine particular classes of cases in which removal seems in-
appropriate.
Removal on the basis of a federal defense was the hardest fought
issue within the Institute in the federal question area, if not indeed
in the entire Study. There was agreement throughout that this kind
of removal should be permissible in some cases, but there were serious
differences about how broadly this should be allowed. Indeed at one
point the Institute, by a vote of 1O2 to 92, directed that the Reporters
bring back alternative drafts of the federal defense removal section,
one allowing this kind of removal generally and the other narrowing
removal on this ground.56 We did so, and at the 1967 Annual Meet-
ing, the Institute, after extensive debate, voted decisively in favor
of the broader and more general draft.5 7 My judgment on the point
is dearly a biased one, but I believe that this provision is a major
advance toward a more rational allocation of division of jurisdiction.
Two of the other proposals in the federal question area go to
matters I cited at the outset as examples of defects in the present
statutes. You will recall the case of the mine superintendent with two
claims against a union, one based on the Taft-Hartley Act and one
based on state law, who could have found out that he could bring the
entire action in a federal court only by studying the Supreme Court
5Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
'43 ALl PROCEEDINGS 309 (x966).
5144 ALl PROCrEINGS 83 (1967).
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decisions and ignoring what seem the plain implications of the present
statutes. We have attempted to provide guidance for a person in that
position by defining with some care, in § .1313, the circumstances under
which a claim created by state law may be heard because it is joined
with a related federal claim. The statute should further the Bright
Line Policy by making an obscure and confusing part of the law
clearer than it has been.
We also addressed ourselves to the strange rule that a case ex-
clusively within federal jurisdiction may not be removed from state
to federal court. We specifically abolished the rule, so that such a
case under our proposals would be removable. 58 But we went beyond
that to cut down the occasions in which such a situation can arise by
proposing repeal of most of the provisions for exclusive federal
jurisdiction,59 so that exclusive jurisdiction is confined to the situa-
tions in which there is a strong federal interest that seems to require
a federal forum, and obscure, unneeded statutes making jurisdiction
exclusive in various cases do not remain on the books as traps for the
unwary.
In one respect we declined a tempting opportunity to clarify fed-
eral question jurisdiction. Though there are many cases in point,
and some of the greatest names in the history of the Supreme Court
have spoken to the question, there is still no clear test by which
to tell when a case is one "arising under" the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States. We were strongly pressed to draft our
general statute on federal question jurisdiction in analytical terms,
and to provide a clear test for jurisdiction. We decided not to do this,
and to retain, with some minor improvements, the cryptic language of
the present statute. The fact is that while this issue raises fascinating
intellectual problems, and provides marvelous examination questions
for law professors to use, in practice it is of almost no significance.
I doubt if I see as many as one reported decision a year in which
there is any serious question whether the case is or is not within fed-
eral question jurisdiction. In the real world almost all cases fall within
stereotyped patterns for which the answer is perfectly clear. No
elaborate research is required to see that a suit to recover overtime
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act does arise under federal
law, while my automobile accident suit against Dean Steinheimer
does not. Most other cases are equally easy. Since the law, however
r'STUDY §§ -31i(d), 1317(b ) .
Id., § 1311(b).
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murky in theory, does work well in practice, we concluded that any
attempt to clarify it by substituting new language might indeed lead
to lack of clarity as courts were forced to struggle with a new text
rather than applying the familiar rules developed under the old.
General Provisions
I will not discuss the sections of the Study dealing with admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction 60 or with cases to which the United States
is a party.61 Here we accepted the existing division of business between
state and federal courts and attempted only to restate it in a clearer
and more coherent fashion. There are however a number of general
provisions, applicable to all heads of federal jurisdiction, that require
at least brief mention.
First, the Supreme Court since 194o has developed a variety of
rules, generally known as the "abstention doctrines," that recognize
various circumstances in which a federal court, though it has jurisdic-
tion, ought to defer to the state courts and let the state courts answer
some or all of the questions the case poses. 62 The circumstances in
which these doctrines are applicable are not clearly defined. In the
last three years there are at least 94 reported opinions of the lower
courts in which they have struggled to apply the doctrines and have
reached wildly inconsistent results. When a court decides that one of
the abstention doctrines requires it to abstain in a particular case, the
result frequently is endless expense and delay, as a case starts out in
the federal court, is then litigated through the whole system of state
courts on some issues, and finally returns for further litigation in the
federal system in the light of the answers the state courts have given
on the state law matters. Our proposed § 1371, attempts to deal with
this in statutory terms. It defines a rather narrow class of cases in which
it is desirable that the federal court defer to the courts of the state,
and provides procedures that ordinarily will mean that if the federal
court does so defer, the federal court is then out of the case for good
and the suit proceeds to judgment in the state courts. I hope this
provides a more rational allocation than the present amorphous
court-made doctrines. I am confident that it is clearer, less wasteful,
and that it will reduce conflict between the two systems.
Next, we have dealt with injunctions from one court against pro-
ceedings in the other system of courts. We have sought to limit the
'Id., §§ 1316-1319.
11d., §§ 1321-1327.
62C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (1963).
[Vol. XXVI
1969] RESTRUCTURING FEDERAL JURISDICTION 203
situations, and define them more dearly, in which a federal court may
enjoin state court proceedings, 3 while at the same time we have put
in statutory form for the first time, and somewhat broadened, the
rule on when a state court may enjoin federal court proceedings.0 4
There are some circumstances, of which the most important are
suits to enjoin enforcement of a state statute on the ground that it
is unconstitutional, in which a special kind of federal court, made
up of one judge of the court of appeals and two district judges, is
required.65 Any lawyer or judge who has ever had occasion to be con-
cerned with one of these cases will agree with Judge Friendly's
description of the statutes calling for this special three-judge court
as "deceptively simple."0 We concluded, with some hesitation, that
the general idea of having a three-judge court should be preserved,
although we have narrowed the kinds of cases in which it is required.
Perhaps the most significant innovation here is that we propose that
this special court be convened only on the request of the state official
who is being sued. This should reduce the number of cases in which
this procedure, which takes such a heavy toll of judicial time, is used,
but it has an even more important consequence. Presently it seems
to be the law that the requirement of three judges is a jurisdictional
requirement. 67 Thus if it never occurs to any party or to the court
that the three-judge statute applies, and a case is fully tried before a
single judge, it is necessary to start all over again if an appellate court
later should decide that the case is within the three-judge requirement.
Our proposal would avoid "so bizarre a result" 68 as this and
in other ways would make it easier than it now is to tell whether three
judges are needed.
Another group of proposals deal with the procedure for removing
a case from state court to federal court.69 These resolve ambiguities
in the present statutes on this subject, and also put an end to the
outrageous practice by which a case in state court can be stopped in
its tracks at the last minute by a frivolous petition for removal.70
There is also an extensive series of sections dealing with what is
cSTuy § 1372.
MId., § 1373.
28 US.C. § 2281 (1964).
6 3Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 1966).
"tKennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 153 (1963); Borden Co. v. Liddy,
3o9 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1962); Riss & Co. v. Hoch, 99 F.2d 553 (0o th Cir. 1938).
0 Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 1o6 (2d Cir. 1966).
WSTUDY §§ 1381-1384.
'Id., § 1383(a).
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called "multi-party multi-state diversity jurisdiction." 71 These would
make it possible for a federal court to hear certain rare cases in which
the parties who must be joined are scattered in different states and
there is presently no court, state or federal, that can obtain jurisdiction
over all of them.
Finally I would call your attention to § 1386, a provision that has
long been needed in the federal courts. It ends the ancient rule that
an objection to federal jurisdiction can be raised at any time. It is
designed to prevent waste of judicial resources by smoking out any
objections to jurisdiction early in the litigation, and by preventing,
under normal circumstances, any consideration of defects in jurisdic-
tion after the federal court has begun trial on the merits.
REACTION TO THE PROPOSALS
This package of proposals for restructuring the relation between
state and federal courts is extensive and complicated. Inevitably it
has already aroused opposition and no doubt more is to come. It
would be astonishing if any lawyer were to review all of the Institute's
work without finding details here and there with which he disagrees.
If I were free to rewrite the draft to express my own preferences on
how each of the subjects it deals with should be handled it would
differ in many respects from the document as it now appears.
The diversity proposals, for example, were completed before I
became associated with the project and my reservations about them
have long been a matter of public record.72 I accept generally the
rationale that underlies the diversity proposals, but I think that the
rationale has been stretched too far in barring a commuter from in-
voking federal jurisdiction in the state in which he works. I fear also
that the provisions about businesses with a "local establishment,"
though rationally defensible, are so complex that in this instance
rationality should have been sacrificed in favor of clarity and efficiency
of judicial administration.
Even in the portions of the Study for which I was Reporter, there
are things I would have preferred to see handled differently. Some
are matters of small detail while others are of greater importance. I
am totally opposed, for example, to the provision allowing a federal
court to certify to a state court questions of state law in those states
WId., §§ 2371-2576.
741 ALI PROCEEDINGS 69, 72 (1964). See also C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 23
(x96).
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that allow their courts to give advisory opinions of this kind.73 I agree
with Judge Hale, of the Washington Supreme Court, that "the certifi-
cation procedure is a dilatory one and in the long run compounds the
very delays it is claimed to help curtail and magnifies the uncertainties
it is claimed to eliminate."74 But the members of the Institute listened
very attentively while Professor Field and I stated our objections to
the certification provision and they then voted overwhelmingly in
favor of the provision.75 I remain stubbornly unconvinced on the
subject, but when such distinguished persons as Dean Griswold of the
Harvard Law School and Judge Gignoux of the District Court in
Maine argued strongly for the position the Institute ultimately took,
it demonstrates that many of these issues are difficult ones, on which
men of reason and good will do not always come to the same conclu-
sion.
I have mentioned my own doubts only to emphasize the point that
the document that will be given to the Chief Justice in a few days
does not contain my recommendations, nor those of Professor Field
or Professor Mishkin. They are rather the recommendations of the
American Law Institute, and represent the collective judgment after
years of work and study of a large group of learned people who have
undertaken a disinterested appraisal of how these hard questions of
jurisdiction can be solved in a fashion that will best serve our country.
Naturally the recommendations of the Institute have not gone un-
challenged. It is surely an exaggeration to say, as a publication of the
American Trial Lawyers Association has done, that the Institute's
proposals have "brought a storm of protest against change from bar
associations, trial lawyers and state judges."76 Debate and criticism
there have been. This was certainly to be expected, and, so long as it
is reasoned debate and responsible criticism, it is all to the good.
I welcome, for example, the two lengthy articles in which Professor
David Currie, of the University of Chicago Law School, has analyzed
with skill and care every aspect of the proposals, agreeing with some
and disagreeing with others.77 Nor am I surprised that distinguished
members of the profession should publicly express very different
attitudes about the general approach taken in the diversity sections.
Some persons whose voices must be listened to with the utmost respect
7STUDY § 1371(e).
711n re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 371 (Wash. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
7543 ALl PROCEEDINGS 371-388 (1966).
"Supra note 31.
7'Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 0a68 (1968-1969).
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believe that that head of jurisdiction should remain substantially
unchanged and perhaps even be expanded.7 8 Others, such as Professor
Currie, conclude that "the security given out-of-state interests by this
jurisdiction is not worth the burden of defining and administering
it," 9 and would eliminate this head of jurisdiction entirely. Finally
there are those who think the balance struck by the Institute with
regard to diversity is the right one8 0 and that it "makes a good deal of
sense." 8 '
I confess to disappointment at those segments of the organized bar
that have hurried to announce their opposition to any change that
would significantly limit the present jurisdiction of the federal
courts-though they are apparently not adverse to expansion of that
jurisdiction. The Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of
the American Bar Association, for example, on the basis of a very
brief report, has recommended that the ABA oppose the Institute's
diversity proposals.8 2 Action on this was postponed by the House of
Delegates on the ground that it would be premature to act until
the Institute had completed its entire Study.8 3 The National Board
of the American Trial Lawyers Association, apparently speaking of
the diversity provisions only, though this is not entirely clear, has
called the proposals "dangerous, unwise, arbitrary and an obstruction
to full and fair administartion of justice."8 4 The attitude of these
critics is best summed up by the bar association in one of the western
states that resolved that it was against any of the Institute's proposals
that would restrict federal jurisdiction and for those proposals that
would broaden federal jurisdiction.
It would be pleasant to think that this enthusiasm for federal juris-
diction is a tribute to the high quality of the federal courts. If that
were so, it would be time to institute a crash program for the improve-
ment of the state judicial systems. The proposition would have been
IsMoore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TExAs
L. REv. 1 (1964); supra note 72. Judge J. Skelly Wright has expressed a generally
similar view in his article, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State
Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317 (1967).
7Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm. L.
R.Ev. 1, 49 (1968-1969).
10C. McGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES
85-87 (1969); Marden, Reshaping Diversity Jurisdiction: A Plea for Study by the
Bar, 54 A.B.A.J. 453 (1968).
$'Asher v. Pacific Power and Light Co., 249 F. Supp. 671, 678 (N.D. 1965).
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tested if the Institute had proposed extending federal jurisdiction as
far as the Constitution permits, but making that jurisdiction exclusive
so that the option of a state forum would no longer have been avail-
able. My guess is that the critics I have just described would have been
even more outraged by such a proposal, for I believe the basis for
their position is not that they love the state courts less but that
they love a choice of forum more. Of course it is tactically ad-
vantageous to be able to choose, and to pick for each case the system
of courts in which a favorable result seems more likely. But surely
our dual court structure was created to serve some loftier purpose
than tactical maneuvering. It is dismaying to see respected bar groups
asserting a vested interest in preserving jurisdictional statutes that
have developed quite fortuitously and that are demonstrably irrational,
unclear, inefficient, and productive of unnecessary friction.
CONCLUSION
So far I have discussed these matters as one who had a part in
working with them and who has therefore a natural bias in their
favor. It is hard to view objectively a report that one has helped to
draft. But I was a Reporter for the American Law Institute for only
a little more than five years, while all of my adult life has been
spent in working, both as a writer and as a reformer, for the improve-
ment of the administration of justice in American courts. It is in that
capacity, and with as much objectivity as I can muster under the
circumstances, that I would like to appraise the Institute's proposals
as a whole.
In my judgment adoption of the recommendations of the American
Law Institute would be a major step in the right direction for the
better administration of justice and for the wise ordering of our fed-
eral system. The proposals there presented would make the division
of jurisdiction between the two systems more rational than it has
been in the past. That is a significant accomplishment, but it is the
least important accomplishment of the proposals. If we must choose
between a reasoned division of jurisdiction and a workable division
of jurisdiction, I would choose the latter every time. The Institute's
proposals, I suggest, do make the system more workable. They mini-
mize conflicts between the two judicial systems. They promote effi-
ciency by cutting down on duplicative and unnecessary litigation. And,
most important of all in my judgment, they make the jurisdictional
line far clearer than it has ever been in the past. They provide answers
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in the statute book itself that any lawyer or judge can read and under-
stand to questions that heretofore have either required elaborate study
in the cases and the textbooks to answer or that have indeed been
unanswerable.
It is easy to find fault with this or that proposal. Any of us can
do that. But if each person interested in the well-being of our courts
insists on his own pet provisions, we shall be so busy arguing among
ourselves that any prospect for meaningful reform will be irretriev-
ably lost. I hope that all of those who care about our courts will give
careful study to the full text of the Institute's recommendations. If
these persons conclude, as I have done, that the things with which
they agree far outweigh those aspects of the proposals with which
they disagree, if they conclude that on balance the adoption of the
recommendations would improve the administration of justice in the
United States, then I hope that they will support enactment of the
proposals as a whole. There will be time enough later to refine and
improve particular details. My most earnest hope-and my strong
conviction-is that as lawyers examine the proposals of the American
Law Institute, they will ask not what effect those proposals would have
on their fees, or on the class of clients they habitually represent, but
whether the proposals are in the best interest of the courts of our
great country.
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